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The starting point for this article is the problem of cross-border liability for environmental damage. More specifically, the focus is on the case of United States v. Ivey, 2 in which a Canadian court considered for the first time the prospect of enforcing a judgment obtained in the United States under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). 3 Relying on one of the conflict of laws' most traditional doctrines, the Canadian-based defendants maintained that the US judgment for the costs of a waste disposal operation in Michigan was unenforceable against them because CERCLA is 'less a liability system dependent on the assignment of fault or responsibility than a site-specific taxation system.' 4 The Ontario Superior Court dismissed this reference to the Revenue Rule, 5 or not the original US case was jurisdictionally correct and therefore transportable across international state lines. 6 In coming to its conclusion, the court in Ivey crossed a number of borders at once. In the first place, it literally crossed the international boundary, permitting the enforcement of a foreign judgment in Canada on the basis of a conflict of laws doctrine whose rationale lies in the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit among sister provinces. 7 Moreover, Ivey crossed from public law to private rights, perceiving the question of environmental liability under CERCLA to be restitutionary rather than regulatory and therefore capable of traversing the partially porous legal border. 8 Finally, and most importantly for the present study, Ivey effectively moved the issue of cross-border environmental law across the frontier separating substance from procedure. When an environmental clean-up case goes international, the question now to be asked is not whether the case is substantively right for enforcement 9 but whether disclosure, service, jurisdictional contacts, and other process requirements have been met. 10 This article uses the procedural issues articulated in a leading environmental case as a jumping-off point for exploring the nature of crossborder litigation and, indeed, civil process more generally. It examines the various 'crossings' engaged by the Ivey case and places them within parallel movements in domestic civil procedure. The study, therefore, strives to do two things at once. First, it will highlight the fluidity of rulings on cross-border civil claims and demonstrate that this fluidity in international legal process, in turn, emerges from a more fundamental fluctuation between a policy of protecting insular legal systems and one of fostering cooperative legal systems. Second, it will compare this to the fluidity of all contemporary civil procedure and will demonstrate that the fluidity of domestic civil process likewise emerges from a more fundamental fluctuation between a policy of protecting litigants' rights and one of fostering dispute resolution.
The cross-border case law, in other words, is used as a mirror or pool in which to reflect on civil process everywhere. It is a particularly narcissistic legal exercise, with process rules gazing back at themselves. The irony, however, is that the thematic fluidity of the international as well as the domestic procedural cases makes it hard for the self-contemplative picture to actually come into focus. The law's structures seem covered in a constantly moving Ivey. II 
Procedural signs

Thomas Pynchon's 1966 novella The Crying of Lot 49
11 is set in a fictional California town whose very name -San Narciso -denotes a society infatuated with its own image in much the same way as international proceduralists are infatuated with theirs. 12 It also reflects Pynchon's own obsession with metaphoric signs that seem to point everywhere 13 and nowhere 14 at once. 15 In the Narcissus story, a youth mistakes his own reflection in a pool for that of someone else and becomes, in Marshall McLuhan's terms, 'a servomechanism of his own extended or repeated image.' 16 The nymph Echo attempts to woo him away from himself, but 17 McLuhan therefore postulates that Narcissus 'had adapted to his extension of himself and had become a closed system' (Ibid.). 18 Perhaps most important of all in this over-determined scene is that the sign on the motel is in a continuous state of motion: Lot 49, supra note 11 at 14-5 ('A representation in painted sheet metal of a nymph holding a white blossom towered thirty feet into the air; the sign, lit up despite the sun, said "Echo Courts" ... ' (1983) 17 So. Humanities Rev. 59 at 70 (Oedipa caught between 'Narcissus, mistaking the creations of her own confused perceptions for external reality' and 'Echo, a real warning from an all-too-real creature'). 20 This essay deals primarily with the procedural and private international law of Canada, but attempts to situate that law within the discursive framework of American law and scholarship. It is not intended to present an analysis whereby one system examines another in an express attempt to learn from parallel doctrines (see M. he is unable to respond even to fragments of his own voice. 17 When Pynchon's symbolically overburdened characters discover the society that is San Narciso and take up lodgings in the Echo Courts motel (complete with a nymph displayed on its own tacky sign of the times), 18 the multiplicity of signs and signifiers becomes almost overwhelming. One does not know whether to experience the signage as Echo or as Narcissusthat is, as metaphoric links to an external reality or as a closed and selfreferential system of images.
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In law, 20 there is generally thought to be no such confusion. Whether legal signposts are seen to be outgrowths of certain social practices 21 or are perceived as a pre-existing matter of the rights of individuals as against one another, 22 they are understood to be linked to political or economic life. 23 One would think that this is particularly the case with an emerging field such as international environmental litigation, where socio-economic developments and legal trends go almost directly hand in hand. It is the ambition of this article to closely examine and to challenge this presumption about international litigation and civil process more generally.
In the Pynchon novella for which this article is named, 24 Oedipa has a riddle of interpretation to solve, 28 and she spends the remainder of the book seeking to resolve the mystery, which turns out to implicate herself and everyone like her. 29 The problem is that it is a mystery that defies rationality and can therefore never be resolved.
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Although the work is set in the form of a detective novel, 31 it has an eccentrically reversed plot (an inversed rarity) 32 in which the sense of mystery only increases as Oedipa and the reader learn more of the story. 33 The enterprise of the plot is seductive, 34 but the knowledge needed to unravel it seems endless. 35 As already indicated, procedural rules appear to be in a similarly endless state of motion. Moreover, this is not just a matter of legal change serving the society's parallel historical changes, or a reflection of the fact that legal procedure is a construction of varying social times. 36 Rather, it Press, 1998) at xxiii-xxix (introducing critical race and feminist theory approaches to procedure). In Canada see J. Fudge, ' would seem that procedural law -in both its international and its ordinary domestic guises -is virtually incapable of being pinned down; its policy ends and embedded social messages are in a constant state of fluctuation. The deeper we delve into it and identify its objectives, the less we actually seem to know. The metaphor around which this article is structured is that of Pynchon's Oedipa moving from her suburban habitat across the tracks to San Narciso and Inverarity's world. 37 In much the same way, the law moves from the old and familiar to the new and innovative. International liability, therefore, travels from its home in sovereign legal systems to Ivey's inroads into cross-border recognition and cooperation, and domestic civil procedure journeys from its old and established world of rights protection to its newly constructed terrain of conflict resolution. In crossing the tracks, Oedipa attempts to interpret a world that is in a state of continual fluctuation; 38 everything, from her perspective as the holder of legal office, 39 comes across as the blur of being caught between forces in motion. 40 It is this blur of analysis, this inability to focus across the borders erected and traversed by the law, that this article attempts to demonstrate and to explore. III 
The unstable world of procedure
As Lon Fuller stated in a famous essay on adjudication, civil process 'should be viewed as a form of social ordering.' 41 However, the fact that should be viewed as a form of social ordering, as a way in which the relations of men to one another are governed and regulated'). 'the foundation of [civil] jurisdiction is physical power,' 42 and that the police power of the state provides the enforcement backup for the rulings of courts, 43 is not itself enough for civil process. A background theme of all procedural design is that legal process must be accepted in its own right -that is, the authority of adjudication must be imminent in the process itself, as Fuller would have it. 44 Thus, before one examines the development of certain procedural rules, it is helpful to know what form of order it is that is being developed.
The character of the social order is likewise present as a background theme in The Crying of Lot 49. Specifically, as a book whose primary subject matter is communication, 45 it focuses on the postal office 46 -tracing its development, as a socio-political organization, from the early systems of the Holy Roman Empire to the Pony Express to the modern governmental service. 47 Communication is thus associated with history, 48 50 Chambers, Thomas Pynchon, supra note 25 at 100 (describing Inverarity's capitalist impulse as 'a kind of modern day colonialism'). 387. 57 Lot 49, supra note 11 at 26 ('So it went: the succession of film fragments on the tube, the progressive removal of clothing that seemed to bring her no nearer nudity ...'). 58 The end goals of civil procedure have been described in various ways, including the protection of dignity and participation, deterrence of wrongdoing, and effectuation of and with Inverarity's 'need to possess, to alter the land, to bring new skylines, personal antagonisms, growth rates into being'; 49 in other words, with law and society. 50 That the social order Oedipa seeks is, like doctrines of procedure, both layered with historical trappings and continuously seeking to reveal its true self; 51 it is illustrated graphically in a renowned scene in which she and the estate's lawyer play a sexual guessing game. Oedipa first dons innumerable layers of clothing and accessories, then successively removes an item for each question answered by the lawyer about the plot of a TV show in which he appeared thirty years earlier. 52 Oedipa becomes, in other words, a caricature of a social order that is at once overdressed and exposed at the historical core. 53 It is this inner value that the lawyer's game -here dubbed 'Strip Botticelli,'
54 there called Civil Procedure -seeks to expose.
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Procedural rules generally struggle against the accusation of arbitrariness by self-consciously dressing themselves in their own policy goals, thereby attempting to identify their own points of inherent authority. 56 The problem is that the goals of procedure, like Oedipa's garments and accessories, 57 are legion. identifiable substantive goals, such as the protection of personal holdings and autonomy, the fostering of private economic ordering, and the redistribution of accident costs. Civil procedure, by contrast, seems like an empty vessel willing to be filled by whatever forms of order the rule makers or their society can conjure. 59 In a legal world where adjudicators typically engage in interpretation and application by reaching directly behind the specific rules to access their social purposes, 60 the multiplicity of unshared social ends creates a problem for civil process and its social ordering even as it attempts to address it.
Despite the various public law, mass tort, and, indeed, international contexts in which civil process often functions, it is the classic two-party private adjudication that remains the model of procedure. 61 The and politically multi-purposed, can largely be grouped around two fundamental themes: rights enforcement and conflict resolution. 63 The former theme has as its central concern the substantive legal relationship between the parties and finds its clearest expression in those rules pertaining to discovery, 64 interim relief, 65 summary judgment, 66 and enforcement of orders. 67 While this theme could focus on the plaintiff as the holder of legal entitlement or on the defendant as the perpetrator of aberrant behaviour, the rules in this group generally emphasize legal protections and the imposition of liability. By contrast, the latter theme has as its central concern the consensual termination of litigation and finds its clearest expression in rules relating to trial scheduling, 68 payment of costs, 69 joinder of claims, and joinder of parties. 70 While this theme could focus on the parties as the strategic actors or on the court as the medium for encouraging compromise, the rules in this group generally emphasize the time and cost of the litigation process itself.
On a close reading of the rules of procedure, one starts to suspect that the dichotomy of themes that is discernible among the rules is, in turn, further replicated within each of them. Thus, for example, the seemingly nondescript rules relating to pleadings 71 invariably contain within them specific directions that combine content regulation 73 with timing parameters. 74 The suggestion embodied in each of these provisions is one of a thematic hybrid of substantive law enforcement and encouragement of compromise. The procedural rules aim at producing a new social or relational order, but it is always unclear whether that order brings the parties together in curtailment of their initial positions or whether it ensures their separation in vindication of their legal rights. Each reading raises a suspicion of the other.
A prime example of the seemingly conflicted operation of civil procedure is found in Ontario's Rule 49. 75 This rule, which provides a mechanism for issuing 76 and accepting 77 an offer to settle, as well as incentives for acceptance of an offer, 78 comes roughly midway through the seventy-seven rules that make up Ontario civil practice. 79 As a rule that deals explicitly with settlement of actions, it appears at first to lie entirely on one side of the compromise/enforcement thematic divide. However, closer observation reveals the rule to be concerned with such matters as the timing of a settlement offer's disclosure to court 80 and the means of enforcing acceptance of an offer. 81 One sees in the signposts of Rule 49, therefore, a suggestion that enforcement of existing rights and of newly created rights is as important as the abandoning of claims of right that is patent in a settlement offer. In a field of law codified to maximize the logic of its intricate design, 82 there is nevertheless a potential countermessage to every message expressed by a given rule.
Since the rules fluctuate between enforcement and compromise, the litigants are inevitably pulled together and pushed apart. Each rule seems to contain within it not one but two forms of social ordering, each of which on its own would suffice as an organizing idea. The effect of reading the rules, then, is one of continuous motion between an apparent embarrassment of social and relational riches. Each social order contains the suggestion of a contrary social order, making the interpretation of procedural codes less of a logical and more of a paranoiac exercise. Rules of settlement are shadowed 83 by rules of enforcement; rules about compromise are haunted by the spectre of rules about rights.
Wading through the rules, a lawyer might sense, as does Oedipa in her first visit to San Narciso, a nagging if not quite identifiable sensation that 'revelation was in progress all around her.' 84 Oedipa's heightened sensitivities to the complex, multiple meanings of nearly every feature of Inverarity's world make her acutely aware that things, much like Rule 49 and its family, are not what they seem. 85 Such awareness of an interpretive universe in which everything 'turn[s] curious' 86 is, of course, unnerving, as signs of an alternative purpose can be read in virtually every other 87 Lot 49, ibid. at 41 ('"These bones came from Italy. A Straight sale. Some of them," waving out at the lake, "are down there, to decorate the bottom for the Scuba nuts."'). 88 Ibid. at 34 ('Beneath the notice, faintly in pencil, was a symbol she'd never seen before'). sign: from human bones found at the bottom of a lake 87 to graffiti on a bathroom wall 88 to the procedural rules governing negotiations with the opposing party. 89 Her legal office has made her the interpreter of a testamentary domain that appears inherently unstable. The innumerable signs of San Narciso, civil process, and the worlds they represent are nothing if not haunting and ambiguous. 90 
IV Procedural portrait of a nation
If procedure, taken on its own, imparts an ambiguous social portrait, it is in measuring the relationship of the society to other societies with which civil process collides that the law promises to bring the portrait into focus. 91 As in the Ivey case, when litigation crosses jurisdictional bounds it brings to the surface the nature of the social relationships, if not between the litigants, then between the jurisdictions themselves. If litigants seem simultaneously pulled together and pushed apart by the Rules, the ability of the law to stand outside the society in cross-border cases holds out the hope of gaining perspective on the nature of legal authority. Thus, one goal of any study of international procedural cases is to attempt to come to terms with the conceptual grounds of procedure itself. Does the source of its authority reside in the parties and their respective rights and subordinate the border they straddle, or does it lie in the society asserting the right to resolve disputes on its own as the legal equal to its neighbour?
In much the same way, Oedipa seeks to grasp the elusive meaning of the will under which she holds office 92 by understanding its source of authority. 93 The authority of the will, of course, is in the desire of the Lot 49, supra note 11 at 134 ('Though she could never again call back any image of the dead man to dress up, pose, talk to and make answer, neither would she lose a new compassion for the cul-de-sac he'd tried to find a way out of, for the enigma his efforts had created'). 96 Ibid. at 133 ('But did it matter now if he'd owned all of San Narciso? San Narciso was a name; an incident among our climatic records of dreams ...'). 97 Ibid. at 134 ('Or he might even have tried to survive death, as a paranoia; as a pure conspiracy against someone he loved'). 98 Duyfhuizen, 'Hushing.' supra note 93 at 82 ('The "text," in the present case of Pierce Inverarity, is the literal will, which is both a metaphor for his life story and a metonym for Oedipa's life story'). 99 Lot 49, supra note 11 at 135 ('What was left to inherit? That America coded in Inverarity's testament, whose was that?'). Pynchon's novel seems, on one hand, to be grounded in the American scene: see Petillon, 'Re-cognition,' supra note 18 at 127 ('... from the same people who brought you the Merry Pranksters and the Hell's Angels, the Grateful Dead and Ravi Shankar ...'). On the other hand, the problems of communication and interpretation with which Pynchon deals seem endemic to contemporary societies: see Petillon, ibid. at 128 ('In some ways, the French reader felt almost at home in The Crying of Lot 49'). 100 Lot 49, ibid. at 58 ('[t]hese follow-ups were no more disquieting than other revelations which now seemed to come crowding in exponentially, as if the more she collected the more would come to her ...'). 101 Ibid. at 69. 102 Duyfhuizen, 'Hushing,' supra note 93 at 81. 103 Lot 49, supra note 11 at 58 ('If it was really Pierce's attempt to leave an organized something behind after his own annihilation, then it was part of her duty, wasn't it ... to bring the estate into pulsing stelliferous meaning, all in a soaring dome around her?').
testator to transmit his worldly possessions beyond death 94 -to Oedipa this means his assets, his life story, 95 San Narciso, 96 her own fears, 97 her own life story, 98 the country itself. 99 The world to which this transmission sends Oedipa is so riddled with clues and signs that are seemingly open for interpretation 100 that she expresses herself like a lawyer swirling in procedural doctrine: overexposed to 'compiled memories of clues, announcements, intimations, but never the central truth itself ...'
101 Since the orderly transfer of property is not in issue in the traditional legal sense -'there are no squabbling relatives ... there is only Oedipa' 102 -she need not concern herself with 'ordinary' legal process. Rather, Oedipa's task is to occupy the interpretive world outside of Inverarity's life and to gage the authoritative voice that crosses (Pierces) the borders into this world. 103 She is mandated to measure the inter-jurisdictional relationship between his life and his legacy. Inter-jurisdictional relationships are measured by Canadian procedural rules along two distinct axes: (a) the provinces to each other and to the national as a whole and (b) the nation to its neighbours. 104 In terms of the historical imagery, 105 two competing pictures tend to emerge from the case law under each of these respective headings. On the one hand there is a paradigm of autonomous and rigidly circumscribed provinces premised on the constitutional compact, 106 which is, in turn, similar in nature to the traditional relations between neighbouring sovereigns and treaty partners. 107 The picture of 'legality' is one of reverse entropy: the overheated, random collision of parties and their jurisdictional disputes crystallizes in the frozen structure of constitutional and international governance.
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On the other hand, there is an equally cogent paradigm of overflowing and interlocked federal and provincial powers premised on overarching constitutionalism, 109 which is, in turn, more similar to a human rights among the people'). For a contemporary expression of the view that sovereignty lies uniquely with the federal tier of government as the umbrella legal authority, see R. that's all'). 117 Ibid. at 77 ('As the Demon sat and sorted his molecules into hot and cold, the system was said to lose energy'). 118 Ibid. at 79 ('You think about all those Chinese. Teeming. That profusion of life. It makes it sexier, right?'). 119 For Oedipa, sorting out signs and other communicative efforts is the only form of work.
Ibid. at 62 ('"Sorting isn't work?" Oedipa said. "Tell them down at the post office ..."').
vision of international affairs than to classical forms of international relations. 110 The picture here is that of entropy, or energy being released: the frozen framework of constitutional strictures unleashes itself into an uncontrolled vapour of colliding litigants and jurisdictions. 111 To follow the trail of procedural rules across borders involves a constitutional analysis before an international one; but, as can be seen, the paradigms are in motion and difficult to sort out.
Likewise, Oedipa travels the route of American culture from suburban order to urban chaos and back -in the words of one critic, 'beyond the "hedge" to the "edge."' 112 Her quest vacillates continually between the crystallized order of her suburban life as a 'Young Republican' 113 and the chaotic energy of 'a hundred lightly-concealed entranceways, a hundred alienations ... in her Republic.' 114 True to the legal doctrine that is its parallel, communication in Oedipa's world is associated with the concept of entropy. 115 Oedipa craves the sensitivity necessary to sort the random, overheated molecules of information drift 116 into patterned units of chilled coherence 117 and finally back again to the steaming profusion of chaotic motion. 118 Communications are continually being sorted 119 as the undifferentiated fast molecules of communicative signs (like litigating parties across borders) are pulled from the differentiated slow molecules (like 120 Ibid. at 62 ('The Demon could sit in a box among air molecules that were moving at all different random speeds, and sort out the fast molecules from the slow ones'). 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. at 34 ('Delivering the mail is a government monopoly'). 123 Tanner, Thomas Pynchon, supra note 24 at 65 ('... a rebellious, insurgent counterforce which dedicates itself to subverting muffling, "muting" the official system -the Tristero'). 124 Johnston, 'Schizo-Text,' supra note 90 at 58 ('... these encounters constitute the novel's episodic plot and ... they may even add up to Oedipa's "seduction"'). the jurisdictionally divided society) 120 and then mixed back again. By engaging in such sorting, the engine of legal procedure is constantly 'violating the Second Law of Thermodynamics, getting something for nothing, causing perpetual motion.'
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It is with two concepts of the nation in mind -inter-provincial pact and overarching constitutionalism -that one approaches the preliminary analysis of cross-border procedural rules. Likewise, it is with two views of society that Oedipa confronts Inverarity's world. The first is represented by the standard communication system of ordinary postal service, 122 while the second is embodied in the alternative postal system that corresponds with the secretive society dubbed 'the Tristero.'
123 For Oedipa, these two conceptions are like a husband and a lover: she is comfortably at home with one and has a 'tryst' with the other. 124 The suggestion is that jurisdictional relationships may, like everything else, be simultaneously frozen and pushed apart, overheated and pulled together, or any combination of the two.
The leading case on procedure and inter-provincial jurisdiction is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Hunt v. T & N Plc. 125 At issue was the constitutionality of a so-called blocking statute legislated by Quebec to prohibit production of corporate documents in litigation outside the province. 126 Originally enacted as a response to the extraterritorial reach of US anti-trust law, 127 the Quebec statute raised a threshold question of jurisdiction and procedure: Is it applicable to, or subject to challenge in, British Columbia proceedings? 128 Reflecting, perhaps, the extent to which the flow of Canadian commerce, persons, and their con- comitant disputes has been north-south rather than east-west, 129 the Supreme Court approached the issue of provincial court jurisdiction over the constitutionality of another province's law as one of first instance.
The Supreme Court's substantive approach to the blocking statute problem accentuated the self-contained authority of each of the provinces within its territorial boundaries. Emphasizing the sovereignty and comity aspects of private international law, the court pointed out that the constitutional requirement that a provincial enactment be directed at matters 'in the province' 130 is akin to the international requirement that there be a territorial nexus to any assertion of jurisdiction.
131 By reaching into British Columbia civil discovery, the Quebec legislation was seen to have invaded a foundational portion of its sister province's domestic process terrain. 132 Restraint of Quebec's long arm statute and protection of British Columbia's insular civil process went together naturally in a confederation of sovereign equals.
Before getting to that point the Court first had to cross the jurisdictional threshold, since the plaintiff had taken the unusual approach of challenging the Quebec statute not in the enacting province's own court but in that of its sister. In assessing British Columbia's procedural invasion of Quebec, the Court took note of 'the essentially unitary nature of the Canadian court system,'
133 in which the courts of each province draw authority from the same source. It was this common judicial sovereignty that prevented Quebec from complaining about the British Columbia court that would otherwise suffer Quebec's own legislated extraterritorial effects. The jurisdictional identities of the two provinces were held to be so equal that they effectively merged into one, allowing the BC Superior Court to be truly superior to the Quebec legislature, whose statute was declared inoperative. Accordingly, in the substantive portion of the judgment the picture of the nation was of separate but equal jurisdictions, whereas in the procedural portion of the judgment the picture was of unitary and unequal courts. The procedures themselves, however, were designed with a view to accentuating the equality and distinctiveness of each provincial society vis-à-vis the others. In other words, the case captured a national portrait in motion. 134 At the very instant that the nation was emerging with equal and insular legislative jurisdictions, it grew unequal and long arm judicial jurisdictions, ultimately taking shape with multiple equivalent parts. The movement that caused a blur on the legal screen was from diversity to unity and then back from unity to diversity. The court's gaze is on the regions and on the nation, with the fast pace of the movement forward and back erasing the line of distinction.
If one is searching for clarity, the Supreme Court provided a rather unsatisfying Hunt. It is unclear in the judgment whether the sovereignty of the law is located in a state of chaotic divisions among competing local authorities or whether it is located in a state of orderly diversity among equally functioning legal systems. Likewise, it is unclear whether the initial movement is toward a state of order in a unitary system or whether it is toward a state of chaos as one province's legal system is allowed to swallow its sister systems. Finally, it is unclear whether the second, reverse movement is in the direction of orderly boundaries for each of the nation's jurisdictions or in the direction of an uncontrolled obliteration of all local rules. The movement of the law, as described in Hunt, is so fast and furious that an image of its authority simply cannot be pinned down.
Not only that, but the substantive and the jurisdictional portions of the Hunt judgment seem to have equal weight, neither taking priority over the other. Thus, it is impossible to determine whether the portrait of process is as the servant of substance, 135 a key unlocking the constitu-tional challenge, or whether substance is the submissive partner of procedure, following as a matter of course the tough jurisdictional decision. 136 Long arm jurisdiction opens the way to provincial equality, which, in turn, drives the permissive procedures in which one province's rules dominate another's. Procedure and substance stalk each other in a mutual Hunt, seeming to alternate in their respective dominance and subordination until the very distinction threatens to fade away. Quebec and the rest of the provinces, local norms and national rules, separation and unity, all oscillate across the slippery constitutional surface, referring constantly to each other but rarely standing still long enough to take in any coherent political scenery.
As Oedipa comes to learn, every communication above ground contains within it the suggestion of a counter-communication below. 137 The face of the nation can literally be portrayed in two distinct ways, as the telltale sign of the Tristero -the defective postage stamp -is personified by the changed expressions (from pleasure to fear) on the philatelic portrait 'Columbus Announcing His Discovery.' 138 The two worlds of unity and diversity, plot and counter-plot, exist simultaneously. 139 Indeed, Oedipa's legal analysis is accompanied by enough aggression, 140 mood swings, 141 fantasies, 142 hysteria, 143 and neurosis 144 that the reality of it all is constantly in question. 145 The legal narrative, like Oedipa's observation of 151 Hunt, supra note 125 at 296 ('full faith and credit' is 'inherent in the structure of the Canadian federation ...'). On the political implications of this rhetorical approach by the court, see Bakan, Ryder, Schneiderman, & Young, 'Developments,' supra note 129 at 119-25. 152 Morguard, supra note 6 at 271 (traditional conflicts rules emphasizing sovereignty 'fly in the face of the obvious intention of the Constitution to create a single country'). 153 Hunt, supra note 125 at para. 63 ('Indeed, the federal Parliament is expressly permitted by our Constitution to legislate with internationally extraterritorial effect. But this appeal is concerned with the provinces within Confederation'). 154 Tolofson, supra note 152 at 315 ('The nature of our constitutional arrangements -a single country with different provinces exercising territorial legislative jurisdictionwould seem to me to support a rule that is certain and that ensures that an act committed in one part of this country will be given the same legal effect throughout the country'). 155 This combination of historical qualities, where England is seen as both isolationist and imperial, is portrayed in virtually all of the Supreme Court of Canada's attempts to reform common law jurisdictional rules. See, e.g., Libman, supra note 107 (common law courts' prohibition on extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction arises from historically the signs Inverarity left behind, oscillates between two visions of the nation that seemingly cannot coexist.
V Legal sovereignty and its equals
To put the Ivey litigation in perspective, one must appreciate not only the difficult thematic content of the Hunt judgment but the thrust of a series of Supreme Court of Canada decisions through the 1990s that effected a wide-ranging reform of the conflicts of law. 147 The others, raising issues of inter-provincial enforcement of judgments, 148 anti-suit injunctions and forum conveniens, 149 and choice of law in tort, 150 all similarly explore the deeper structure of federalism, 151 making a point of characterizing the country as possessing a distinct persona that differentiates it from its English roots. 152 The suggestion is one of a nation capable of recreating the inherited common law in its own image.
The theme that initially emerges from the Supreme Court's conflicts of law cases is one of national distinctness. The Court stresses union of the provinces over protection of their respective territories 153 and asserts the need to revise private international law doctrine to conform with the demands of national sovereignty. 154 Both the isolationism of the English unitary state and the imperial reach of traditional English law 155 give way to a cross-jurisdictional embrace of the provinces as a political and economic family, distinct in their sovereign community from other equivalent sovereigns. In narcissistic fashion, Canadian law looks at what it thinks is another nation's (i.e., England's) image, but it actually gazes with fascination at the reflection of itself. Identity, of course, is typically defined in terms of what it is not. Thus, for example, in Pynchon's world male characters (e.g., Mike Fallopian) 156 give birth, usually to contrary ideas about national identity and history. Likewise, male figures (e.g., Stanley Koteks) 157 reflect female hygiene and, as engineers, sanitize society's waste. Indeed, waste itself defines the social system as advocating a silent, alternative communication ('We Await Silent Tristero's Empire'). 158 One must, in defining a society, define what it throws away, or what is its waste. 159 Oedipa contemplates the clues and counter-clues, conspiracies and counter-conspiracies, that are the communicative wealth of San Narciso, but at the same time she observes and ponders the country's disinherited, its wasted: 160 'What is left to inherit?' she asks. 161 The societal identity is contemplated with reference to that from which it appears to be distinct.
As the waste disposal controversy in Ivey illustrates, the most natural procedural setting in which to view the image of national distinctiveness is in cases pertaining not to domestic conflicts but to international ones. What one might expect to find in such cases is that there can be little, if 162 For a discussion of the two views of procedural rules, one as a product of and thus wedded to social and political policy and the other as a product of and thus grounded in transnational rights, see E. Morgan, 'Discovery' (1999) 10 E.J.I.L. 583 at 598-603 (considering the discoverability requirement under 28 U.S.C. §1782 any, reconciliation between independently sovereign legal systems whose differing rules of process reflect divergent national policies. 162 There may be, for example, procedural versions of the explicit clash of legal systems that arises when extraterritorial anti-trust enforcement bumps up against legal support for national monopolies 163 or foreign property rights.
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International conflicts cases, premised as they are on comity among sovereigns, 165 should predictably crystallize a sense of national distinction among the different jurisdictions in play.
In looking into this prospect it is worth proceeding in two stages, crossing the border a number of times in the process. In international legal terms, a society can see its own reflection by examining the way it appears in the eyes of other similarly situated courts or, alternatively, by contemplating its own jurisdiction in comparison with that of other similarly situated societies. Bringing the point down to North American litigation, US courts have occasionally had to gaze across the border in order to size up Canada, and Canadian courts have on occasion had to gaze across the border in order to size up themselves, all in an attempt to find an appropriate jurisdiction for civil litigation. It is interesting to look at each of these cross-border reflections in turn.
The most prominent subject matter giving rise to this exercise is not environmental liability; in that developing field, Ivey has snaked across the border on its own. Rather, the most prolific field of legal activity has been in the area of securities fraud litigation, where Canada has provided an abundant source of defendants for US-based plaintiffs. Most of the cases focus on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, where a moving party must convince a court, among other things, that an alternative forum exists for the claim. 166 Thus, procedures on one side of the border must be explicitly held up for measurement against those on the other.
In evaluating Canadian alternatives to US litigation, US federal courts have come to a surprisingly diverse set of conclusions. In particular, in determining whether Ontario's class action procedures serve the same purposes as their US counterparts, some courts have determined that doctrinal gaps in Canadian law makes the relevant class certification procedure 'virtually meaningless.' 167 The northern version of the class action, in this view, becomes little more than an aggregate of claims subject to individualized assessments of liability. Other courts, by contrast, have found that '[i]f anything, in fact, it looks easier to get class certification under Ontario law than under U.S. law.' 168 Canadian class actions, in this view, present a far lower threshold than their American counterparts for the plaintiffs to constitute themselves as a class and to move the action forward on a collective basis.
How is it possible, one might reasonably ask, for the identical jurisdiction to be evaluated so differently by various US courts? It turns out that none of these courts purports to reject either a foreign jurisdiction or the domestic federal one; the analysis is rarely, if ever, posed as a matter of one jurisdiction sitting in harsh judgment of another. Instead, the courts straddle the border in a game of deference; either they defer to the sovereignty of the foreign nation whose law they respect, or they defer to the sovereignty of the US law whose policies they are bound to enforce.
This schism in the conflicts rulings starts at the very beginning of transnational litigation, with the threshold question of jurisdiction. 169 In particular, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction has become the first battle ground for US plaintiff classes and their Canadian targets. The subject matter jurisdiction cases, in turn, are inherently ambiguous with respect to the alleged misdeeds of companies trading on foreign markets. The courts are split between those that require the Canadian conduct causing the plaintiffs' losses to be no more than ' and those that require some further 'tipping factor' to weigh in favour of US jurisdiction. 171 The substantive securities law policies that drive these holdings are equally inconclusive. As a starting point, it is true, if not entirely responsive to the issues raised by the cases, to say with the Fifth Circuit that US securities legislation is for the most part 'designed to protect American investors and markets, as opposed to the victims of any fraud that somehow touches on the United States.'
172 On the other hand, it is equally true to say with the Second Circuit that any 'conduct' of the defendant or 'effect' of its actions in the United States, or any 'admixture or combination of the two,' 173 can establish subject matter jurisdiction in a field where neither the governing statute nor the rules promulgated under it provides guidance to the question of extraterritorial application. 174 It seems obvious in reading the cases that the location of fraudulent conduct and its effects on the cross-border market could be anywhere the court wants them to be. The securities market, and the law by which it is governed, is portrayed as cutting across international frontiers or as bisected by foreign borders, depending on the impulse tapped by the case. 175 The cross-border US cases provide a mirror image of the internally contradictory theme found in Ivey, Hunt, and, indeed, all of the Supreme Court of Canada's recent attempts to reform the conflicts of law. In the court's view, the provinces constitute a distinctive national unit, different in both form and substance from other nations; at the same time, the Court sees nations generally transformed by a global economy that has caused their distinctive identities to meld. 176 Like its US counterparts, the Canadian court perceives the country as simultaneously incomparable to its political equivalents and identical to its trading partners across the border.
The most prominent example is the 1990 Morguard decision, 177 in which the Supreme Court of Canada created a full faith and credit requirement for foreign judgments out of a silent constitutional text. In coming to this result, the Court first distinguished Canadian provinces from territorial sovereigns 178 and then aligned inter-provincial relations with current international relations. 179 Accordingly, it presented federalism as distinct from internationalism 180 while, at the same time, it built up its enthusiasm for the changed economic times and circumstances on which global relations are founded. 181 The upshot of all of this was that the Court pursued changes in conflicts doctrine by pursuing two contradictory themes. On the constitutional side, the Morguard case stands for the proposition that the provinces represent an economic union and can ill afford to treat each other as if they are truly foreign when it comes to mutual enforcement of judgments. On the international side, however, the Supreme Court stressed the volume of cross-border commerce, giving rise to the felt need 'to facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and people across [increasingly irrelevant] state lines.' 182 In this global economy, the court surmised, Canada can ill afford to treat its trading partners as if they are not part of the same continental and, indeed, transcontinental market. Thus, the second theme to emerge from the international conflicts cases is that of continental similarity. The country may be constitutionally distinct from other countries, but at the same time it is no different from the rest of the nations it encounters in trade.
In a process that can only be described as reverse narcissism, Canadian law here looks at what it thinks is the nation's own image but is actually gazing with fascination at the reflection of someone else (i.e., the United States). 183 Like so many acts of communication and cultural transmission, to belong to the priesthood of some remote culture'). 188 The identification of lot 49 as containing, for Oedipa, the significant asset in the auction of Inverarity's estate has been associated by critics with images of religious revelation. See Tanner, Thomas Pynchon, supra note 24 at 68 ('49 is the Pentecostal number (the Sunday seven weeks after Easter), but Pentecost derives from the Greek for "fifty," so the moment at the end of the book when the auctioneer's spread arms are civil process is a phenomenon in motion. One is reminded of Oedipa Maas's radio interview, conducted by her husband, in which he introduces her as 'Edna Mosh.' 'It'll come out the right way,' he assures her afterward. 'I was allowing for the distortion on these rigs, and then when they put it on tape.' 184 From speaker, to interpreter, to audience, to reinterpreter, and so on, the broadcast of identity -whether personal identity in the media or national identity in legal discourse -is a moving target. Each pronouncement yields a distorted interpretation, as the law stands on Morguard for thee than one thought it could handle.
As the case law on both sides of the border demonstrates, the sovereign authority of legal process both is grounded in and transcends the nation. The more is revealed about it the more one needs to know. Furthermore, transportation across competing visions is instantaneous, making a crystallized moment in process impossible to capture. It is, in fact, much like an upscale version of the elusive Rule 49, the concerns of the law being simultaneously the atomistic parties and the systemic need to embrace them. Internationally, the self-image of these procedural rules is one of motion between distinctive national societies and the allembracing global one. Procedural rules and their internationalization are inevitably a work in process. VI 
The exhaustion of procedure
There is no end to this chasing of the tale that is Rule 49 and all of its internationalized variants. In trying to capture civil procedure as either bringing people together or pulling them apart, the courts have cried out 185 the possibilities for legal sovereignty, but the answer has not been revealed. 186 Authority has been placed in the disputing parties and beyond them, in their regions and their nation, and in their distinct society and their global culture. The cases provide gestures of culture, 187 but they fall short of enlightening us as to the social meaning of the law. 188 Having internationalized the thinking about procedure, the law still seems to be waiting for the sense of it all to emerge. 189 At the end of the analysis, international lawyers anticipate the very question of procedural meaning -the true connection to society and its politics -with which the Ivey inquiry began.
The many visible images of authority embedded in legal process cases seem to rebound endlessly around a self-enclosed conceptual space, never slowing down long enough to connect in a socially, economically, or politically meaningful way. 190 The more one sees the society and its processes pictured in the law, the less one seems able to actually grasp. Civil procedure, like Inverarity's world, is unstable in its multiplicity of designs, 191 and the international analysis, like Oedipa's inquiry, 192 has no moorings among its multiple sources of authority. 193 Indeed, even looking for the socio-economic or political meaning of the law may be futile. As if to articulate this very point, Oedipa's husband, Mucho Maas, describes his frustration in deciphering a dream about a sign posted by the used car dealership where he works:
In the dream I'd be going about a normal day's business and suddenly, with no warning, there'd be the sign. We were a member of the National Automobile Dealers' Association. N.A.D.A. Just this creaking metal sign that said nada, nada, against the blue sky. I used to wake up hollering. 195 Ibid. at 87 (Oedipa wonders 'if the gemlike "clues" were only some kind of compensation. To make up for having lost the direct ... Word'). 196 Tanner, Thomas Pynchon, supra note 24 at 63 (describing 'ever-increasing number of clues which point to other possible clues which point to other possible clues which ... there is no end to it').
Likewise, in international litigation, there may be NADA beyond what we see on the Mucho signposts of the case law. The singular Word, the social essence that Oedipa seeks, 195 is replaced in the unstable analysis of civil process by multiple meanings and signs. 196 Cross-border environmental liability and its national enforcement policies, Rule 49 and its vacillation between rights and compromise, the sovereignty of states and the sovereignty of the law that embraces them, all reverberate with an exhaustion of meaning. It is a tangle of Ivey with no substance underneath. The form of the law is replenished with each procedural step, but in this excess of replenishment the content is emptied out.
